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1. Introduction
No firm is a self-contained organisational entity, which is only 
occasionally connected with a few faceless counterparts via mar-
ket transactions (Hakansson and Snehota 1989). The hierarchy-
market dichotomy prominently featured in mainstream econom-
ics - that presumes that firms are ”islands of conscious power in 
an ocean of unconscious cooperation like lumps of butter coagu-
lating in a pail of buttermilk” (Robertson and Dennison 1923, p. 
85) - has no touch with the real-life intricacies of the business 
setting in which firms do compete, transact, and cooperate with 
one another (Granovetter 1985). As long as the pervasiveness of 
B2B cooperative arrangements is acknowledged, firms can no 
longer be depicted as “islands of planned coordination in a sea of 
market relations” or likewise as “autonomous units buying and 
selling at arm’s-length in markets” (Richardson 1972, p. 883). 
The business world is populated by a multitude of firms, 
which develop and sustain among themselves both aggregates 
of discrete transactions and ensembles of inter-related coopera-
tive relationships (i.e., markets and networks respectively). One 
may easily provide evidences on the ubiquity of those business 
relationships and networks and reaffirm, à la Richardson (1972), 
the Smithian view that specialisation and interdependence nec-
essarily go hand in hand in the B2B terrain.
1.1 Hierarchies, Markets, and Networks
The coordination of economic activities is made either through 
(i) the ‘visible hand’ of hierarchies or (ii) the ‘invisible hand’ 
of markets or in alternative, via (iii) a relational governance 
structure. The decisions pertaining to the so-called division of 
labour depend largely on the (relative) costs and benefits of (a) 
using the authority within the firm, (b) ‘playing the market’, or 
instead of (c) entering into and nurturing cooperative linkages 
with counterparts. That is to say, a given economic activity may 
be coordinated (and consequently its outputs may be brought 
about) (i) within the boundaries of a single firm, or instead those 
outputs may be (ii) traded in markets (through inter-firm trans-
actions) or otherwise (iii) systematically exchanged through 
mutually rewarding buyer-seller interactions (and lasting coop-
erative arrangements). So, the firm either ‘does things by itself’ 
(i.e., it ‘makes’) or ‘gets things done by others’ in markets or in 
networks (i.e., it ‘buys’ from or ‘cooperates’ with counterparts, 
respectively).
While the similar activities (which require the same set of re-
sources and capabilities for their undertaking) are often housed 
within a firm, the closely complementary (yet usually dissimilar) 
activities are likely to be found inside the boundaries of coun-
terparts with which the firm cooperates (Richardson 1972). As a 
consequence, vertical cooperation is bound to be critical to the 
internal functioning and/or development of each and every firm 
(Axelsson and Easton 1992). Understandably, the ‘strategic im-
portance’ of customer-supplier cooperation has been frequently 
stressed in the B2B literature (e.g., Sousa 2010).
1.2 Boundary decisions: make or buy or cooperate
The extensiveness of B2B interactions and relationships makes 
it unlikely that the core business of a firm is defined (and its 
boundaries are delimited) merely as the result of that firm choos-
ing either (i) to perform internally a certain economic activity 
(and then sell that activity’s outcome in a product market) or 
(ii) to acquire an external activity’s output (in a factor market). 
Inter-firm cooperation is also a possibility, alongside the com-
mon options of (i) organic development and (ii) engagement in 
purely transactional relations with counterparts.
The nature and role of the long-lived and complex B2B re-
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lationships seem to provide valid grounds for the primary ana-
lytical thrust of this paper: that the make-or-buy dichotomy (and 
its related theorizing, usually transaction cost-inspired) (e.g., 
Zenger, Felin et al. 2011) is less than satisfactory to explain how 
and why the firm makes boundary decisions (concerning which 
activities are to be kept inside its boundaries and which activities 
are to be left outside, and thus which resources and capabili-
ties are to be internally developed, bought in factor markets, or 
instead accessed and explored via cooperation). It seems almost 
intuitive that the ‘vertical disintegration’ increasingly observed 
in the business world needs to be justified by considerations oth-
er than the ones supplied by Oliver Williamson’s (1979) trans-
action cost minimising ‘recipe’ for an efficient match between 
exchange transactions (which differ in terms of the degree of 
frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity) and coordination 
mechanisms (namely, hierarchical, market, and relational ones).
Plus, that dual firm-market reasoning leaves little room for ex-
plaining the emergence and development of the heterogeneous 
governance structures (e.g., of a different size, composition, and 
modus operandi) that are found to co-exist in the business world. 
For one does not only come across either large, vertically inte-
grated hierarchies or spot B2B (factor and product) markets.
This paper also follows Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) in their 
attempt to downgrade the Organizational Economics’ rationale 
that vertical integration is the primary (if not the ‘only’) solution 
(i) to avoid or solve hold-up problems (i.e., the expropriation 
by an opportunistic counterpart of the firm’s quasi-rents, which 
are the returns on its relationship-specific investments made in 
excess of the respective opportunity costs) and/or (ii) to provide 
balanced incentives to (or promote the alignment or shift of in-
centives between) two cooperating parties.
Given the aforementioned conceptual state of affairs, this pa-
per primarily aims to provide a few building blocks for a robust 
theoretical foundation to emerge in favour of the make-or-buy-
or-cooperate decisions of the firm.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, one dis-
cusses briefly the division of labour in the business world and its 
causes and consequences. The third section of the paper address-
es the (heterogeneous) nature and scope of the firm, in particular 
the different kinds of capabilities and the activities that the firm 
is likely to develop and perform internally. In the fourth sec-
tion, one strives to add to the (incipient) analytical framework 
on the make-or-buy-or-cooperate decisions, therefore rejecting 
the quasi-axiom - à la transaction cost economics - that there is 
only a polar boundary choice on offer (namely, either the firm 
makes itself or buys from others). The final section includes the 
theoretical implications.
2. Specialisation and cooperation: the co-evolution of 
business specialisms
Adam Smith (1776) was the first to identify the substantial advan-
tages that are likely to result from the division of labour, namely 
(i) the increasing dexterity and efficiency in the performance of 
each activity (and its sub-activities) and/or (ii) the development 
of ‘local’ innovations. The analysis of various ‘businesses’ oper-
ating in the 18th century (most notably, the pin-maker factory) 
led him to two major claims: (i) that, given each individual’s 
‘power’ (and ‘disposition’) to engage in exchanges of productive 
surpluses, self-interest may stand out as the primary cause of the 
division of labour; and (ii) that the conspicuous inequality of 
human expertise promotes and is reinforced by increases in the 
division of labour (Smith 1776, pp. 109, 119, 120).
But Adam Smith also made an important caveat. Though 
largely beneficial, specialisation cannot be pursued limitlessly. 
It is limited by ‘the extent of the market’, as George Stigler’s 
(1951) dictum made clear later on. That is to say, any increase 
in the productivity of an activity (i.e., in the form of a higher 
efficiency and/or a greater throughput) has to be accompanied 
by the growth of the market demand for that activity’s outcome.
The Smithian rationale was extended a century and a half later 
by Allyn Young (1928), who was focused on the ‘increasing 
returns’ that were often brought about by the deployment of a 
high-throughput machinery. Young argued that the division of 
labour sets in motion a series of changes both within firms and 
across industries (e.g., novel know-how, activities, and products, 
or new startups). All those changes (not only of a qualitative 
kind) are the result of a cascade of teaching and learning pro-
cesses taking place inside as well as beyond each firm’s bound-
aries. 
Those (in- and out-) flows of knowledge may help explain 
why the internal economies of otherwise large, multi-product 
firms are likely to give way to the internal and the external (also 
know as Marshallian) economies of highly specialised firms 
(Young 1928, p. 538). Firms may thus take advantage of their 
own economies (of a limited scope) as well as of the economies 
explored by (highly specialised) counterparts. Young (1928, 
pp. 528, 538) further acknowledged the B2B embeddedness by 
claiming that (i) the external economies usually exceed the sum 
of all firms’ internal economies and (ii) the growth of some in-
dustries is contingent on the growth of other, mostly vertically 
related (ancillary) industries. 
So, inasmuch as firms are often engaged in lasting vertical co-
operative arrangements with each other, their nature and scope 
are likely to be inter-connected (Granovetter 1985). That is to 
say, the nature and the scope of a firm affect and are affected by, 
to varying extents and in diverse ways, the nature and scope of 
the counterparts with which that firm is directly and/or indirectly 
connected (e.g., a supplier and a customer’s customer, respec-
tively). Given the ‘generalised connectedness‘ of firms (as well 
as of their cooperative relationships), ‘co-evolution’ is likely to 
be a notorious feature of the B2B world (Levinthal and Myatt 
1994, p. 49).
2.1 Division of labour inside and among firms: differen-
tiation and interdependence
Though one intuitively understands that the division of labour 
necessarily features the increasing (sub-)division of economic 
activities (i.e., ‘differentiation’), one is not usually ready to 
grasp the attendant ‘integration’ of the resulting outcomes. But 
what is often the case, the specialisation of firms goes hand in 
hand with the development and reinforcement of B2B coopera-
tion (Piore 1992).
Regardless of the respective field of expertise, being (or be-
coming) a specialist does not make one self-sufficient; the con-
trary is the norm. The division of labour impels the (specialist) 
firm to access and explore the dissimilar yet closely complemen-
tary resources and capabilities (that are likely to be found within 
the boundaries of counterparts), often through vertical coopera-
tive arrangements.
This specialisation-cooperation duality inherent in the di-
vision of labour, firstly alluded to by Adam Smith (1776, pp. 
116-7) who stated that final products were the joint outputs of a 
diversity of labour efforts, was explicitly recognised by Alfred 
Marshall (1890). By taking advantage of a biological, evolution-
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ary outlook on the survival and development of organisms in 
the natural world, Marshall (p. 241) foretold the concurrence of 
differentiation and integration in the business landscape: “(...) 
that the development of the organism, whether social or physi-
cal, involves an increasing subdivision of functions between its 
separate parts on the one hand, and on the other a more intimate 
connection between them. Each part gets to be less and less self-
sufficient, to depend for its well-being more and more on other 
parts, so that any disorder in any part of a highly-developed or-
ganism will affect other parts also”. Allyn Young also seemed to 
share that view, by remarking that “(…) an increasingly intricate 
nexus of specialised undertakings has inserted itself between the 
producers of raw materials and the consumer of the final prod-
uct” (1928, p. 538, emphasis added) and recommending that 
“industrial operations [should] be seen as an interrelated whole” 
(1928, p. 539). And Wroe Alderson’s (1965) functionalist theory 
of marketing also argued for the existence of a sequence of inter-
related B2B exchanges (i.e., ‘transvections’) in each distribution 
and marketing channel.
So, it is no surprise to say the division of labour entails the 
emergence and the co-evolution (and increased interdependence) 
of business specialisms over time. One should bear in mind that 
the primary benefits of the division of labour, efficiency gains 
(e.g., reduced production costs) aside, include both the enhance-
ment of the existing resources and capabilities of the firm and/
or the development (or co-development) of new resources and 
capabilities. Marshall (1890, p. 241, emphasis added) also made 
this point: “This increased subdivision of functions, or ‘differ-
entiation’, as it is called, manifests itself with regard to industry 
in such forms as the division of labour, and the development of 
specialised skill, knowledge and machinery (...)”. 
3. The embedded firm
Given that the firm is endowed with only a limited set of re-
sources and capabilities, it is always in need of external (closely 
complementary yet dissimilar) resources and capabilities for its 
survival and/or growth. That limitedness (and heterogeneity) is 
arguably the major reason for the notorious embeddedness of 
the firm; but one should also take into account that the heteroge-
neous nature of the firm is likely to be ‘fed’ by its embeddedness.
It thus makes little sense to depict each firm as a fully inde-
pendent and clearly bounded hierarchy, which is surrounded by 
a wider environment over which it has but a smaller influence. 
The real brick-and-mortar firm has no rigid (vertical) boundaries 
and is semi-autonomous, being deeply entangled in a variegated 
texture of economic, social, and technological linkages with 
multiple counterparts (Hakansson and Snehota 1995).
3.1 Business setting: context and environment
The firm does not operate only in a hostile and uncontrollable 
environment that exists independently of that firm’s intents (and 
surely predating it and enduring after its demise), and with the 
impact of which the firm needs to cope.
Besides those faceless and all-powerful environmental forces 
(e.g., political, economical, technological, and social ones), the 
firm is to be found within a context (Hakansson and Snehota 
1989). That context includes all the distinct, full-faced counter-
parts that the firm knows relatively well and with which it inter-
acts directly and/or indirectly over time, mostly via cooperative 
relationships (namely, suppliers, customers, suppliers’ suppliers, 
customers’ customers, and even competitors and complemen-
tors). Any context is therefore (co-)created and shaped, to vary-
ing extents, by each of the participating firms.
Each firm should no longer be taken to be a mere (unilateral) 
decision-maker and resource controller (Ford, Hakansson et al. 
1986). The firm is mostly interaction-oriented, thus being much 
more than a production function.
3.2 Nature and scope: resources, capabilities, and acti-
vities
When looked in detail, the firm is nothing more than a heteroge-
neous bundle of resources and capabilities (Penrose 1959).
Many resources are available for purchase in factor markets; 
yet, the most ‘valuable’ resources usually can only be developed 
inside the firm and at a substantial cost. Imperfectly imitable re-
sources, such as reputation or brands, are examples of the latter 
(Barney 1986). In addition to resources, one is also likely to find 
within the firm’s boundaries a certain mix of capabilities.
Corporate capabilities (either individual or collective) are the 
distinctive know-how internally developed over time as a result 
of the repeated and varyingly skilled performance of a given 
set of activities (so-called ‘routines’), which often involves the 
combined deployment of several resources (e.g., blue collar 
workers, machinery, electrical power, and organisational culture 
to mention a few) (Dosi, Nelson et al. 2000). In short, capabili-
ties may be seen as a knowledge-based, idiosyncratic by-product 
of the firm’s routinised praxis over time, in both doing things and 
getting things done (Loasby 1998).
Any capability development process is likely to be time-con-
suming and costly, for both trial-and-error learning and huge 
investments are needed in order to create, refine, and revise the 
firm-specific and ‘sticky’ tacit knowledge of ‘how to do compe-
tently (some but not all) things’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).
Each firm can be seen as a highly specialised organisational 
entity that knows how to do a few things by itself and conse-
quently, that needs to (and does) know how to get other things 
done by others (Nelson and Winter 1982). That is to say, the firm 
has direct and indirect capabilities, both of which contribute de-
cisively to its survival and growth (Loasby 1998).
4. Either make or buy... Why not cooperate?
Each firm is an interdependent hierarchy with fuzzy (vertical) 
boundaries within which resources and capabilities are some-
what developed, deployed, combined, and modified as well as 
activities are performed with varying degrees of efficiency, ef-
ficacy and/or proficiency. Those boundaries are not fixed once 
and for all; regardless of how vertical boundaries are ‘drawn’ at a 
given point in time, they can be changed yet often at a cost (e.g., 
if the firm needs to cope with rapidly changing product market 
conditions).
4.1 Boundary decisions, neither twofold nor discrete
For the firm, keeping or changing boundaries is basically about 
choosing (i) which resources, capabilities, and activities reside 
(or should be brought) internally and consequently, (ii) which 
resources, capabilities, and activities are to remain ‘outside’ (and 
thus be left promptly accessible and explorable through coopera-
tive relationships with counterparts or to be intermittently pur-
chased in markets). This is the basic thrust of each of the mul-
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tiple make-or-buy-or-cooperate decisions that the firm makes 
over time, for which there is no definitive recommendation.
Different theories and conceptual frameworks are bound to 
issue contrasting normative guidelines on boundary decisions, 
that is to say, ‘where’ the firm should define its (vertical) bound-
aries and therefore ‘what’ is likely to be the (limited) scope of 
the firm. At the forefront of those theories is likely to be the 
transaction cost economics, which argues that the firm should 
opt for the organic development (instead of the internalisation 
of inputs or even the vertical integration of the respective sup-
pliers) whenever the overall costs of the ‘making’ option are ex-
ceeded by the costs potentially incurred in the ‘buying’ (e.g., see 
Williamson 2005). The firm should thus opt for the efficiency-
maximising governance structure that brings about the lowest 
(relative) costs of coordinating the relevant economic activities.
One of the most important shortcomings of the transaction-
cost minimising rationale is that it neglects for the most part the 
substantial impact that B2B cooperative relationships usually 
have over where the firm’s vertical boundaries are to be ‘drawn’. 
That impact, which has been lent both analytical and empirical 
support, mostly under the research umbrella of the markets-as-
networks theory (e.g., Araujo, Dubois et al. 2003) but also else-
where (e.g., Barney 1999), can be grasped as follows: the firm 
may keep its vertical boundaries unchanged while, at the same 
time, extending (or reducing) its scope by engaging in (or termi-
nating) cooperation with competent counterparts. The firm may 
thus alter its scope without having to redefine its boundaries, that 
is, without needing to opt for making or buying things.
With that relational impact in due consideration, two argu-
ments are likely to be brought to the foreground of analysis: (i) 
that the boundary decisions of the firm need to be examined in a 
greater detail; and (ii) that the definition of vertical boundaries is 
unlikely to be the outcome of a series of discrete boundary deci-
sions taken by the firm over time.
The boundary decisions of the firm are seldom discrete and 
dichotomous (cf. Williamson 1975). Firstly, those decisions are 
likely to be closely connected to each other over time, as well as 
somewhat linked with the boundary decisions of the significant 
counterparts with which the firm maintains strongly coopera-
tive arrangements. Holmstrom and Roberts (1998, p. 92) seem 
to take a similar viewpoint: “It is (...) questionable whether it 
makes sense to consider one transaction at a time when one tries 
to understand how the new boundaries are drawn. In market net-
works, interdependencies are more than bilateral, and how one 
organises one set of transactions depends on how the other trans-
actions are set up.”. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the boundary decisions of the 
firm are threefold given the availability of a third option, namely 
that of cooperating with others in alternative to the conventional 
make or buy choices (Gibbons 2001). The firm is not necessar-
ily obliged to either develop organically or internalise all the 
resources and capabilities that it needs in order to do the things 
that it does (or aims to do), since there may be the possibility of 
accessing and exploring (at a cost) those externally available re-
sources and capabilities, primarily through vertical cooperation.
4.2 The (few) things that the firm does, hence the 
(other) things that it gets done
There seems to be a relevant argument that is largely overlooked 
in any of the mainstream theories of the firm: that the things that 
the firm does by itself and the things that it gets done by oth-
ers, which are both ‘consequences’ of the multiple make-or-buy-
or-cooperate decisions the firm took over time, are likely to be 
inter-related to some extent (Araujo, Dubois et al. 1999).
First, one knows that the firm does the things that it is capable 
of doing with the inputs at hand. That is to say, the firm performs 
the activities for which it has the required (internal) resources 
and capabilities as well as by taking advantage of some exter-
nally available resources and capabilities. But there may also be 
the case that the firm does some things by itself only because it is 
unable to get those things done timely, efficiently, and/or profi-
ciently. For (i) there may be no (highly) competent counterpart(s) 
with respect to the demanded activities and (ii) the firm is unable 
to persuade others to do the things that it would aim to get done, 
most likely because very high dynamic transaction costs were to 
be incurred. 
The ‘relatedness’ of the things that the firm does and the things 
that it gets done is a corollary to the fact that there are always 
some things that the (highly specialised firm) is in need of and 
can only found outside its boundaries: and in those cases, the 
firm may choose to get those things done either through arm’s-
length relations or by engaging in cooperative relationships with 
counterparts.
To grasp that relatedness, one may think of, for instance: (i) 
a particular firm that requires a specific set of resources and 
capabilities (which are closely complementary yet dissimilar 
compared to those that it owns and controls internally) in order 
to perform a given set of activities and to obtain the respective 
outputs; and (ii) that such set of resources and capabilities is 
externally available (e.g., can be found within the boundaries 
of a clearly identified supplier). What is the firm to do then? 
Should the firm internally develop that set, even if the stand-
alone option incurs a great amount of organic development costs 
and entails a lot of time and a higher risk of failure (e.g., given 
the absence of previous experience in such resource and capa-
bility development processes)? Or in alternative, is the firm ad-
vised to readily acquire that set of resources and capabilities in 
an open market? Or instead of internalising the aforementioned 
set, should the firm access and explore it through a long-standing 
cooperative arrangement?
Regardless of the firm’s basis for making each of its boundary 
decisions (and the outcomes that it expects to obtains from that 
decision), one may always wonder why that was the case. As 
Richardson (1972) presciently argued, there is likely to be no 
comparative advantage whatsoever for a particular set of closely 
complementary yet dissimilar resources and capabilities being 
brought within the boundaries of the firm, through internal de-
velopment, internalisation, or vertical integration. That potential 
‘disadvantage’ may help explain the firm’s choice for exploring 
important resources and capabilities through cooperation, given 
that a relational governance structure is likely to be more advan-
tageous (e.g., allowing the firm to take advantage of a greater 
productive efficiency or a higher level of proficiency in a par-
ticular activity or even in a given field of expertise).
One should always bear in mind that the costliness of devel-
oping or internalising resources and capabilities (especially the 
dissimilar ones) warrants a careful assessment by the firm (Bar-
ney 1999). For in many observed instances, the hierarchical as 
well as the market governance costs to be potentially incurred by 
the firm are likely to outweigh the costs resulting from engag-
ing in the alternative of B2B cooperation. Plus, the benefits of 
adopting a relational governance structure may largely exceed 
the potential benefits of opting for the internal development or 
the internalisation of those needed resources and capabilities or 
even for the vertical integration of a highly resourceful, compe-
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tent counterpart.
Interestingly, Williamson’s (1979) analysis suggests that the 
relational benefits and costs may be more ‘attractive’ than the 
benefits and costs being brought about in either the hierarchical 
or the market governance structures whenever the asset specific-
ity under consideration is symmetrical (and not too high). This 
may be the case regardless of the degree of contractual incom-
pleteness and the frequency of the inter-firm exchange episodes 
under consideration, and assuming that there is a moderate un-
certainty concerning the future ‘states of the world’ (namely, 
forthcoming contingencies and the respective ‘appropriate’ ac-
tions to be taken by the firm).
In the event of any or both of the two above-mentioned condi-
tions being observed (i.e., the relational benefits outweigh the 
hierarchical and/or the market governance benefits and the rela-
tional costs are less than the hierarchical and/or the market gov-
ernance costs), inter-firm cooperation is very likely to emerge 
and thrive. And it is the conjunction of those two conditions that 
may well put flesh on the bones of Richardson (1972), who first 
advanced the raison d’être of the mutually rewarding coopera-
tive arrangements developed amongst buying and selling firms 
over long periods of time. Needless to say, the B2B coopera-
tion goes alongside the heterogeneity of firms, with the latter de-
manding and reinforcing the former.
5. Implications
This paper builds upon three major analytical stepping stones: 
(i) Richardson’s (1972) view on the three governance structures 
co-existing in the business world (namely, hierarchies, markets, 
and inter-firm cooperation); (ii) Nelson and Winter’s (1982) and 
Loasby’s (1998) arguments on the business relevance of both 
the direct and the indirect capabilities of the firm (i.e., the firm’s 
know-how to do things by itself and its know-how to get things 
done by others, respectively); and (iii) Holmstrom and Roberts’ 
(1998) analysis on the determinants of boundary choices. 
It primarily endorses a knowledge-based view of the firm, thus 
taking that highly specialised hierarchical entity as competing 
in markets as well as being deeply embedded in wider B2B co-
operative arrangements and networks. Each business specialism 
evolves gradually on account of the firm’s routinised perfor-
mance of (and the associated development of the idiosyncratic, 
tacit knowledge of how to do distinctively well) only a limited 
number of activities within a given field of expertise, through 
the combined deployment of a restricted bundle of internal and 
external resources and capabilities.
The (potentially expandable) scope of the firm, which is 
grounded in the limitedness of the internal resources, capa-
bilities, and activities, is likely to lead to the appropriation of 
substantial specialisation gains (e.g., a higher throughput or a 
greater productive efficiency). The magnitude of those gains is 
likely to justify at large the extent of vertical disintegration (and 
B2B cooperation) found throughout the business world.
In short, the firm often chooses to be a specialist, thus striv-
ing to become increasingly competent at performing only a few 
(core and ancillary) activities. And as Young (1928) stressed, 
that decision implies that the firm deliberately relies on some 
(‘significant’) external business specialisms, with which it is of-
ten connected through cooperative arrangements. So, the firm’s 
rule of thumb is to be both highly specialised and strongly linked 
with (vertically related) specialists, both upstream and down-
stream. 
This (knowledge- and network-based) view of the firm im-
plies that a different conception of the boundary decisions and 
of the strategy development process needs to be brought to the 
foreground.
5.1 Make or buy? There is no such thing as a twofold 
boundary decision!
No firm is a business island, which is only occasionally linked to 
other firms through purely economic transactions. As the Rich-
ardsonian (1972) analysis made clear, three governance struc-
tures co-exist in the business world: hierarchies, markets, and in-
ter-firm cooperative arrangements. So, to think of the boundary 
decisions of the firm as a twofold and discrete decision-making 
process is a delusive way to conceptualise the way the firm pro-
ceeds to change its nature and scope, mostly in order to adapt to 
evolving contextual and environmental conditions.
The (trichotomous) boundary decisions of the firm are hence 
about choosing what things it makes by itself and what things 
it gets done by others (either buying from or cooperating with 
them). That is to say, the firm chooses one of three alternative 
options: (i) to internally develop the resources and/or capabili-
ties it needs and to perform the required activities in-house; or 
(ii) to internalise the valuable resources and capabilities it is in 
need of, by engaging in transactions with counterparts (or even 
by vertically integrating those counterparts as a whole); or (iii) 
to access and explore those (external) resources and/or capabili-
ties by developing and sustaining cooperative arrangements with 
competent counterparts.
5.2 The (quasi-extended) nature and scope of the firm
By taking boundary decisions, top managers often intend inter 
alia to change the nature and scope of the firm (e.g., by choosing 
to ‘make X’ or ‘buy the input Y from supplier A’ or ‘cooperate 
with supplier B in order to explore the input Z’). 
The make-or-buy-or-cooperate decisions are likely to lead to 
(mostly incremental) modifications in both the things that are 
to be found within the boundaries of the firm (i.e., its internal 
resources and capabilities) and the things that it is capable of 
doing and of getting done (i.e., internal and external activities). 
But while the making and the buying options imply the expan-
sion of the firm’s vertical boundaries (given that new resources 
and/or capabilities are organically developed or are internalised, 
respectively), the (bilateral) decision to cooperate with a coun-
terpart does not necessarily bring about any boundary change. 
So, it is worth stressing that the alternative of engaging in co-
operative arrangements allow to extend the nature (and more 
importantly, the scope) of the firm while leaving unaltered its 
increasingly fuzzy vertical boundaries.
The nature and scope of the firm are greatly delimited by its 
(vertical) boundaries; but the fuzziness of those boundaries, in 
face of the widespread B2B cooperation, makes unlikely that 
the nature and scope of the firm are defined once and for all by 
boundaries alone. Cooperation provides for the possibility that 
the nature and scope of the firm can be both enlarged (or re-
duced) even if the firm’s vertical boundaries stay unchanged: 
for instance, consider the case of a large multinational firm that 
chooses to expand its scope of activities on the basis of newly 
explored, external resources and capabilities, which are accessed 
through a recently developed cooperative relationship with a 
foreign and highly proficient supplier.
As Patel and Pavitt (2000, p. 329) correctly stress, the (inter-
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nal) resources, capabilities, and activities make up the nature 
or ‘core’ of the firm, rather than trace unequivocally its (verti-
cal) boundaries. Moreover, that threefold nature sets at large the 
scope of the firm, that is to say, the things that the firm both does 
and is capable of doing with varying degrees of efficiency, ef-
ficacy, and/or proficiency. But one must also bear in mind that 
the scope of the firm is not unrelated to the scope of (significant) 
counterparts: for the firm’s scope is likely to be affected by (and 
to affect), to varying extents, the scope of the (most important) 
suppliers and customers with which the firm develops and main-
tains strong and long-lived cooperative arrangements over time.
5.3 A new view... of corporate strategy?
The mainstream strategic management literature often depicts 
corporate strategy largely as a tool at the firm’s disposal, which 
is aimed at the creation and renewal of competitive advantages in 
a cut-throat business setting (e.g., by means of putting to work a 
low cost leadership) (Porter 1980). But, as Axelsson (1992) and 
Gadde et al. (2003) point out, the embeddedness of the firm and 
the co-evolution of capabilities (and of business specialisms) are 
likely to demand a very different outlook on corporate strategy.
Strategising in the highly networked B2B world is more likely 
to boil down to (re)defining the nature and scope of the firm 
over time, that is to say, making decisions and taking actions 
concerning (i) what the firm owns and controls within its (fuzzy) 
boundaries and (ii) the things the firm both does and gets done 
by others, at present and in the future. Strategy-making, in es-
sence, may be all about deciding: (i) which resources and ca-
pabilities are to be owned and controlled by the firm (and thus 
being kept within boundaries) and which activities the firm is 
to perform (and is capable of performing); as well as (ii) which 
external resources and capabilities (and activities) are to be ac-
cessed and explored by the firm via (mostly vertical) cooperative 
arrangements.
If this is so, a ‘good’ strategy-making process is likely to add 
to the likelihood of business survival, by promoting the dynamic 
alignment of the firm with (i) a changeable context (e.g, rapidly 
shifting customer preferences or modifications in a major sup-
plier’s productive process and output) and/or (ii) an unpredict-
able environment (e.g., new regulation, economic stagnation, or 
a technological breakthrough) (Hakansson and Snehota 1989). 
This said, it seems that a quite different analytical view on the 
intricacies of the (embedded) strategy development processes 
taking place in the B2B world is to be advanced (e.g., see Sousa 
2010). One hopes that such a theoretical account, among other 
possible lines of research on the firm, may built upon the argu-
ments put forth in this research paper.
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